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THE MAKING OF THE MODEL EMPLOYMENT
TERMINATION ACT
Theodore J. St. Antoine*
Abstract: Courts in about 45 states have ameliorated the harshness of employment at will,
but the common-law modifications still exhibit serious deficiencies. Legislation is needed.
The Model Employment Termination Act proposes a balanced compromise. It would protect
most employees against discharge without good cause and it would relieve employers of the
risk of devastating financial losses When liability is imposed. Arbitration procedures under
the Model Act would also be simpler, faster, and cheaper than existing court proceedings.
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INTRODUCTION

Cornelius Peck is one of a small band of scholars who heralded the
most significant development in the whole field of labor and employment
law over the past quarter century. During that period, and especially
during the last dozen years, courts in about 45 jurisdictions have used
one legal theory or another to carve out exceptions to the once-universal
doctrine of employment at will.' Under that pernicious doctrine, as one
famous nineteenth century court decision put :t, employers could
"dismiss their employees at will ... for good cause, for no cause, or even
for cause morally wrong." In 1967 Lawrence Blades advocated judicial
development of the tort of "abusive discharge." 3 Reasoning by analogy
to the abuse of legal process, he argued that even the exercise of a right
may be actionable if based on wrongful motives
In 1976 Clyde
Summers called for statutory protection against unjust dismissal,
believing legislation was necessary because of the courts' "unwillingness
to break through their self-created crust of legal doctrine."5
Professor Peck took a different tack in a 1979 article.6 First of all, he
agreed with Professor Blades that legislative reform was unlikely since
there were no organized interest groups to lobby for just cause
guarantees.7
The principal beneficiaries would be unorganized
employees. Employers would oppose any limitation on their autonomy
in the workplace. Unions would oppose the loss of one of their major
selling points, the assurance of job security. Peck then contended that
the "continued implementation of the rule that an employer under a
contract terminable at will may discharge employees without cause is
sufficiently bound up with governmental action that the protections of

1. 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) IERM 505:51 (July 1993); Charle. G. Bakaly, Jr. & Joel M.
Grossman, The Modern Law of Employment Relationships (2d ed. 1992); William J. Holloway &
Michael J. Leech, Employment Termination: Rights and Remedies (2d ed. 1993); Henry H. Perritt,
Jr., Employee DismissalLaw and Practice(3d ed. 1992).
2. Payne v. Western & A.R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled by Hutton v. Watters, 179
S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915); see also H. G. Wood, Law of Master and Servant 272-73 (1877). A
contract of hire for a fixed term is an exception to at-will employment.
3. Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power,67 Colum. L. Rev. 1404 (1967).
4. Id. at 1423-24.
5. Clyde W. Summers, IndividualProtectionAgainst Unjust Dismissal: Timefor a Statute, 62 Va.
L. Rev. 481,521 (1976).
6. Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Dischargesfrom Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40
Ohio St. Li. 1 (1979).
7. Id. at 3.
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the Fourteenth Amendment are applicable."' Pointing to the substantial
body of statutory and common law already in existence to protect some
employees against termination without cause, Peck concluded that
keeping similar safeguards from nonunion employees in the private
sector would "constitute a deprivation of equal protection, because there
is no rational basis for denying job protection to some employees while
granting it to others."'
I recall thinking at the time that Peck's thesis, although its aims were
admirable, would fail on two counts. First, the Supreme Court had
recently exhibited a strong inclination to cut back on its previous
extension of the "state action" concept.'0 Second, legislatures have an
established ability to "implement their program step by step," or remedy
"one phase of one field . ..neglecting the others," without violating
equal protection requirements." I now realize, however, that Peck may
have been wilier than I originally perceived. After making what I felt
was a rather strained constitutional argument, he went on to say:
Even if the arguments developed above fail to persuade courts that
the rule currently applied to employment for an indefinite term is
unconstitutional, they may nonetheless achieve their purpose ifthey
induce courts to give serious consideration on the merits to the
suitability of that rule in contemporarysociety. 2
Who knows whether a desire to avoid a sensitive constitutional
question may have influenced the approaches of any of the courts that
modified at-will employment in the years following Peck's article? At
least we know that our highest court has often stretched a statute to
finesse vexing constitutional issues. 3 We also know that federal and
8. Id. at 25-26.
9. Id. at42.
10. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (holding that a private shopping center
could exclude union pickets from mall and adjacent parking lot), overruling Food Employees v.
Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)
(holding that a private club holding a state liquor license could refuse service to a black person).
11. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (holding that a city could ban food pushcarts
generally but "grandfather" those operating eight years or more); Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (holding that state could prohibit fitting eyeglasses
without a prescription but exempt sellers of ready-to-wear glasses).
12. Peck, supranote 6, at 42 (emphasis added).
13. See, e.g., Edward 3. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568 (1988) (holding that secondary boycott ban on "coercion" of neutral employers did not
apply to handbilling urging customers to refrain from patronizing any of the shops in a mall where a
nonunion contractor had been retained to construct a department store); International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961) (holding that congressional authorization for compulsory
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state courts have frequently cited Peck, 4 and that the courts have gone on
to employ tort, 5 contract, 6 and other common-law17 theories to
ameliorate some of the harshest rigors of employment at will. On a
celebratory occasion like this, why need we look closer for a causal link
with the thesis of our esteemed honoree?
Elsewhere I have written at length concerning the deficiencies of the
judicial modifications of at-will employment, 8 however welcome they
are as a first step in the right direction. From the employee's
perspective, they do not go far enough. The tort theory generally
requires some outrageous violation of a well-established public policy,' 9
a relatively rare occurrence. The contract theory will be unavailable if an
employer refrains from any oral or written assurance of job security" or
rescinds a previous commitment by adequate notice to the work force.2'
Only a handful of states accept the most expansive theory, the covenant

dues payments under union security agreements impliedly forbids use of objecting employees'
contributions for political causes they oppose); Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944)
(congressional grant of exclusive bargaining power to majority union impliedly imposes obligation
to represent minority employees fairly and nondiscriminatorily).
14. E.g., Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Serv., Inc., 653 F.2d 1057, 1062 (5th Cir. 1981); Pugh v.
See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 921 (Ct. App. 1981); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335
N.W.2d 834, 835 (Wis. 1983).
15. E.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted
Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876
(Il1. 1981); Brockneyer, 335 N.W.2d at 834. Contra Murphy v. American Home Products Corp.,
448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983).
16. Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 917; Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich.
1980); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441 (N.Y. 1982).
17. Buysse v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 623 F.2d 1244 (8th Cir. 1980) (covenant of good
faith and fair dealing); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (same); Maddaloni
v. Westem Mass. Bus Lines, Inc., 438 N.E.2d 351 (Mass. 1982) (same).
18. Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust DischargeReform Heads Toward Full
Flower, 67 Neb. L. Rev. 56, 58-65 (1988); Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Model Employment
TerminationAct: A Threat to Management or a Long-Overdue Employee Right? in Proceedingsof
N.Y.U. 45th Ann. Nat'l Conf.on Labor 269, 274-78 (Bruno Stein ed., 1993).
19. E.g., Tameny, 610 P.2d at 1330 (firing for refusal to join price-fixing conspiracy); Petermann
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. Asp. 1959) (firing for refusal to
commit perjury at behest of employer); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975) (firing for serving
on a jury).
20. E.g., Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1986); Woolley v. HoffrnanLaRoche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1260, modified on other grounds, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985);
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984).
21. E.g., In re Certified Question Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co.), 443 N.W.2d 112 (Mich.
1989). Cf Enis v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 795 F.2d 39,41 (7th Cir. 1986).
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of good faith and fair dealing.' Finally, even if an employee has a solid
legal claim, few rank-and-file workers will have a monetary claim
sufficient to attract the services of a lawyer relying on a contingent fee.
From the employer's perspective, when the common-law regime does
operate, it goes too far. Several studies of California cases found that a
plaintiff who could reach a jury won almost 75 percent of the time, with
the average verdict around $450,000.23 Juries can succumb to emotional
appeals, and they have awarded single individuals $20 million, $4.7
million, $3.25 million, $2.57 million, $2 million, $1.5 million, $1.19
million, and $1 million.24 Company attorneys have told me that the
expense of even a successful defense of a wrongful termination claim
before a jury could range as high as $100,000 to $200,000. On balance,
the present common-law system ill serves all parties, except perhaps the
plaintiffs' bar. Therefore, while recognizing the validity of Peck's
concerns about political obstacles, I still believe that ultimately
legislation must provide the solution. I should not even object if some
solons were moved by Peck's insistence that a constitutional infirmity
afflicts the current state of the law.
In this paper I first provide a brief history of the drafting of the Model
Employment Termination Act (META) and its reception by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL).
Thereafter I discuss in more detail META's individual provisions and the
various policy choices that were made in the course of its formulation.
II.

THE UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS AND THE MODEL
ACT

A.

Backgroundof the Commissioners

The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
was formed in 1892, following a recommendation of the American Bar
22. Maybe a bit generously, the Bureau of National Affairs lists about a dozen jurisdictions. 9A
Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) IERM 505:51 (July 1993). I would also exclude Montana because its
pioneering wrongful discharge statute largely preempts common-law actions. Mont. Code Ann. §§
39-2-901, -913 (1993).
23. Cliff Palefsky, Wrongful Termination Litigation: "Dagwood" and Goliath, 62 Mich. BJ. 776
(1983); Discharge Verdicts Average $424,527 in California, 9A Lab. Rel. Rep., 1 Ind. Empl. Rts.
(BNA), No. 14, at 3 (Mar. 3, 1987); see also James W. Dertouzos et al., The Legal and Economic
Consequences of Wrongful Termination (1988).
24. Kenneth Lopatka & Julia Martin, Developments in the Law of Wrongful Discharge,in ABA
NationalInstitute on Litigating Wrongful Discharge and Invasion of Privacy Claims vii, 13-18
(1986).
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Association that the states create a body of commissioners to promote
uniform legislation in the United States." All the states, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico eventually participated. Each state decides
on the manner of selecting its own commissioners. State delegations
average about six persons each, so that the total membership of the
Uniform Law Commissioners (ULC) is around 300. Commissioners
tend to be prominent and influential lawyers, judges, legislators, and
academics in their state-usually solid, middle-of-the-road types, not
given to extremes of any sort.
The NCCUSL meets for a whole week every year, usually near the
time of the ABA's annual meeting. All proposed undform or model acts
must be read through line by line at two annual sessions before being
approved. The more complex or controversial measures may require
three or more readings. Suggestions and amendments from the floor, as
well as questions and comments, are frequent and discussion is spirited
and uninhibited. Final adoption is by vote of the states, with each
delegation casting a single vote.
Since its founding, the NCCUSL has promulgated some 200 uniform
laws.26 Over 30 of these have been passed in at least half of the U.S.
jurisdictions, including such major and varied enactments as the Uniform
Commercial Code, the Uniform Arbitration Act, the Uniform Partnership
Act, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, and the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act.27
Drafting committees perform the bulk of the commissioners' work in
producing proposed acts for consideration by the full NCCUSL. The ten
or so voting members of these committees are drawn exclusively from
the ULC. They are usually generalists or specialists in areas of the law
other than the one under study. The aim is to avoid persons with
preconceptions or axes to grind. Reporters or draftpersons, almost
always law professors, and a substantial number of outside advisers from
a wide range of interested groups provide technical expertise. The ULC
committee members, however, have ultimate responsibility for all policy
judgments.

25. A short sketch is provided by James J. White, Ex Proprio Vigore, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 2096,
2097-2103 (1991). See also W.O. Hart, The Movementfor Uniform State Laws, 23 Case & Com.
646, 646-47 (1917).
26. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1991-92 Reference Book 2
(1991).
27. Id. at 114-18.
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The committee makes a determined effort at achieving consensus, but
majority rule prevails on the most divisive issues. There is little, if any,
secrecy. Invited outsiders participate vigorously in debates and are
present during committee votes. At least in theory, any member of the
public may observe committee deliberations. A drafting committee
ordinarily meets two or three times during the year for intensive twoand-a-half-day working sessions. The entire committee then makes a
presentation before the NCCUSL at the annual meeting.
B.

The Commissioners' Treatment of the Model Act

The ULC Scope and Program Committee recommended in January,
1985, that the Executive Committee appoint a committee to draft a
Uniform Wrongful Termination Act.28 The recommendation was based
in part on studies indicating that recent judicial modifications in the
doctrine of employment at will had created great uncertainty for both
employers and employees. Somewhat ironically, in light of subsequent
developments, the original impetus for the move may have been a
concern that the courts were improperly breaching the wall of at-will
employment. Members of the Scope and Program Committee stressed
that uniformity would be desirable because employees might be hired in
one state, work in another, and be fired in a third, and that the subject
gave the NCCUSL an opportunity to provide guidance in an area of
growing confusion. Despite this rationale, the entire venture was
undoubtedly something of a departure from the traditional mission of the
organization, which was the codification of existing principles rather
than law reform.29 In 1985, Montana had not yet passed what is still the
only state statute forbidding a discharge except for good cause," and no
state court had gone that far as a matter of common law. 31 But of course,
a willingness to burst the confines of original boundaries is a hallmark of
almost any dynamic institution.
At the 1985 annual meeting, the ULC Executive Committee set up the
Study Committee on Proposed Employment Termination Act. The chair
was Stanley M. Fisher, a leading antitrust lawyer in a major Cleveland
28. This and much of the following historical material is drawn from the prefatory note
accompanying the official text of the Model Employment Termination Act, which was mostly
prepared by the drafting committee's reporter (the author of the present article). See 9A Lab. Rel.
Rep. (BNA) IERM 540:21, 21-23 (Dec. 1991).
29. White, supranote 25, at 2098 and authorities cited therein.
30. Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-901 (1993).
31. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
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corporate law firm. In June, 1986, Fisher transmitted a report in which
the study committee unanimously recommended establishing the
Drafting Committee on Uniform Employment Te:amination Act. The
Executive Committee adopted this recommendation at its February, 1987
midyear meeting. On October 5, 1987, Chair Fisher formally advised the
eight other members of the new drafting committee of their
responsibilities. In addition, two ex officio members participated
regularly. I was named reporter, or principal draftsperson. A threeperson review committee was also appointed, with union lawyer James
A. King of Honolulu as chair.
The ULC invited advisers from the ABA's Section of Labor and
Employment Law and Section of Torts and Insurance Practice, the AFLCIO, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of
Manufacturers, the National [Plaintiff] Employment Lawyers
Association, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, the American
Civil Liberties Union, the American Arbitration Association, the
National Academy of Arbitrators, and other interested groups and
individuals, including legal scholars and attorneys practicing in the field.
Most responded positively and contributed substantially to the drafting
committee's deliberations, even submitting statutory language or
explanatory commentary at critical junctures. The committee circulated
a large number of law review articles and other relevant studies of
wrongful discharge and proposed solutions among its members and
advisers. The committee also examined bills prepared in several states,
especially those in California, Illinois, Michigan, and New York, as well
as the one statute that had just been enacted in Montana.
The drafting committee held full working sessions on February 19-21,
1988, in New Orleans, on November 18-20, 1988, in Dallas, and on
March 10-12, 1989, in Los Angeles. Each meeting produced a new or
completely revised draft. The core of the proposal was the prohibition of
the discharge of most classes of employees unless there was good cause.
The preferred method of enforcement was to be through professional
arbitrators rather than civil trials. The review committee approved
submission of the draft to the 98th annual meeting of the NCCUSL in
Kauai, Hawaii.
The proposed act received its first reading on August 2 and 4, 1989,
with the commissioners sitting as a committee of the whole. In addition
to presenting many varied questions and comments from the floor, the
commissioners adopted two "sense of the house" resolutions. The first
called for an explicit antipreemption provision preserving the commonlaw rights of those employees, such as probationers, who would not be
368
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entitled to the new statutory protections. The second directed the
drafting committee to include an authorization for employers and
employees to execute agreements setting performance standards. Failure
to meet the agreed standards could constitute good cause for dismissal.
During the first reading, the most notable occurrence was a motion to
discharge the draffing committee on the grounds the whole project was a
futility and a waste of the commissioners' time. A comfortable though
not overwhelming margin defeated the motion. Even so, this almost
unprecedented vote, conducted before the initial reading of the statute
was actually completed, was a striking demonstration of the hostility the
Act could arouse when first encountered. That may make all the more
significant the ultimate disposition of the proposal two years later by the
NCCUSL. The subsequent about-face of the commissioners may be a
harbinger of events in other arenas in the years to come.
Responding to the points raised and the resolutions adopted in Hawaii,
the drafting committee had two more meetings on December 8-10, 1989,
in Denver and on March 9-11, 1990, in Chicago. Two more revised
drafts resulted from the meetings. The NCCUSL conducted a second
reading on July 18, 1990, at the annual meeting in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin.
A principal development there was the committee's
compliance with suggestions from the floor to emphasize an employer's
prerogative to exercise honest business judgment in making economic
decisions affecting the size and composition of its work force.
What proved the committee's final drafting sessions were held on
November 9-11, 1990, in Chicago and on February 22-24, 1991, in
Denver. The third and last reading before the NCCUSL took place on
August 3-5, 1991, at the 100th annual meeting of the conference in
Naples, Florida. The committee adopted a number of changes, primarily
of a technical nature, following motions from the floor. Employers and
employees were also permitted to agree to private dispute-resolution
procedures as an alternative to the statutory system. Final votes were
taken on August 8. By the fairly close margin of 29 to 21, the
conference first declined to adopt the employment termination proposal
as a uniform act. It then approved the proposal as a model act, with the
32
impressive majority of 39 states in favor and only 11 against.

32. 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) IERM 540:21 (Dec. 1991). There were two abstentions.
Furthermore, Puerto Rico voted against approval as a model act because it was irked at the
conference's failure to approve the legislation as a uniform act. Puerto Rico already has a "good
cause" discharge statute. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 185a (1985, Supp. 1990).
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The technical explanation for designating a proposal as a model act
rather than a uniform act is that the NCCUSL considers uniformity a
desirable but not a principal objective, with the act's purposes being
achievable without its adoption "in its entirety by every state" and
"without the same emphasis on adhering to the verbatim text."33
Operationally, commissioners from each state are obligated to seek
legislative consideration of both uniform and model acts,34 but this
obligation appears to be stronger for uniform acts. Naturally, a greater
cachet is attached to a uniform act. But the controversial and innovative
nature of the Model Employment Termination Act probably explains
why a majority of the state delegations in the NCCUSL opted for the
model designation.
III. THE MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT
A.

Philosophy

The premise of the Model Employment Termination Act is that both
employees and employers have valid, if sometimes competing, interests
in the employment relationship which deserve legal protection.
Employees are entitled to freedom from arbitrary treatment in the
workplace. Employers are entitled to maintain efficient and productive
operations. When resort to the legal process becomes necessary,
employees and employers alike are entitled to procedures that are as fast,
simple, and inexpensive as is practicable. META tries to meet these
manifold needs by a series of practical compromises. The objective is a
fair balancing of the claims of the affected parties. Employees covered
by META gain certain irreducible substantive rights to job security.
Employers are relieved of the risk of potentially devastating monetary
liability. All parties should profit from the superior decision-making of
professional arbitrators. A more detailed analysis of the principal
provisions of the Model Act follows.

33. Statement of PolicyEstablishingCriteriaand Proceduresfor Designation and Consideration
of Acts §§ 4(6)(b), 7 (Aug. 2, 1988), in National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, 1991-92 Reference Book 111-13 (1991).
34. Id. at 113.
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B.

Analysis

1.

Good Cause

The Model Employment Termination Act would prohibit the
discharge of covered employees except for "good cause."35 Good cause
may be either misconduct or malperformance on the part of an individual
worker, or the economic goals and requirements of the enterprise, as
determined by an employer exercising good-faith business judgment.
The drafters chose "good cause" rather than the "just cause" found more
commonly in union contracts to emphasize the discretion allowed
management in economic decisions. The official comments expressly
urge attention to "principles and considerations generally accepted in
arbitration" in the interpretation of META.36 This means that literally
thousands of arbitral precedents are available to help flesh out the term
"good cause."
Examples of good cause for the termination of an individual employee
listed in the commentary on META include theft, assault, destruction of
property, drug or alcohol use on the job, insubordination, excessive
absenteeism, and inadequate performance. 37 Off-duty conduct may be
grounds for termination if it affects the employee's job performance or
the employer's reputation.
The standard applicable to individual dismissals is objective.
Ultimately the arbitrator or other factfinder must make the judgment.
Distinguished management counsel among the drafting committee's
advisers actually favored the good-cause criterion over a subjective
standard like good faith and reasonable belief. The drafters thought the
more objective term to be more equitable and more predictable because
of its long use and refinement in labor arbitrations.
Several factors may enter into a good-cause determination. Was the
work rule allegedly violated reasonable? Was the employee properly
apprised of it? Was enforcement consistent? Was there a full and fair
investigation? Was the penalty that was assessed appropriate? All of
these considerations are familiar to anyone experienced in unionmanagement arbitrations. In addition, the level and importance of the
employee's position will be significant. An employer's latitude in

35. Model Employment Termination Act [hereinafter META] §§ 1(4), 3(a), 7A U.L.A. (Supp.
1993).
36. META § 1(4) commentary at 71 (Supp. 1993).
37. Id.
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deciding on the suitability of the individual's continuing employment
will increase according to the level and sensitivity of the employee's
position. Finally, discrimination in violation of applicable federal, state,
or local law or other violation of established public policy would, of
course, contravene the good-cause requirement.
In contrast to the generally objective review of the discharge of a
given individual, the standard governing economic decisions concerning
layoffs or other terminations is largely subjective. The nature and scope
of the enterprise, the size of the work force, the location of plants, and
similar matters are all entirely within the province of management. The
only limitation on an employer's business judgment is good faith. Thus,
a sham layoff, for example, may not be used as a device to dismiss an
employee when there is no good cause for a terminatton.
An employer is also entitled to set performance standards for
particular positions, and the level may be as high or demanding as the
employer wishes. The only qualification is that standards may not be
arbitrarily varied in order to prejudice a disfavored individual. In
traditionally competitive fields, such as professional sports, the
entertainment industry, or most professions, the standard could be "the
'
most proficient performer available."38
2.

Persons Covered

META would protect most full-time employees (those working 20 or
more hours per week) after they have served one year with an
employer."
While the probationary period under most collective
bargaining agreements is shorter, META reflects a dramatic change in
the employment relationship, and it applies to all levels of employees,
including higher-ranking personnel in policy-making posts. The drafters
felt it appropriate to grant management a rather generous length of time
to evaluate personnel. Moreover, an employee's sense of an equity in the
job grows as the months pass. The drafters believed that a year is about
the point at which this sense could properly be treated as a reasonable
expectation.
The Act does not cover smaller firms having less than five
employees. 40 The drafters realized small firms may be guilty of some of
the most reprehensible conduct in the workplace. Nevertheless, many
38. Id. at 72.
39. META §§ 1(1), 3(b).
40. Id. § 1(2).
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worried about a misallocation of scarce resources and about a
counterproductive intrusion into the intensely hostile atmosphere that an
intimate setting can generate.
My own initial notion was to exclude high-level policy-making
executives. In the upper reaches of management, it seemed to me, policy
judgments could become so intertwined with the question of good cause
for termination as to defy an outsider's capacity for judgment. Besides,
corporate vice-presidents could be counted on to take care of themselves
through "golden parachutes" and the like. But once it became clear that
anyone not covered by the statute would retain all common-law rights,"
employer representatives objected to my proposed exclusion. Well-paid
corporate personnel are the very people with those six- and seven-figure
claims that employers fear the most. The committee thus revised META
to protect even the highest-ranking corporate officials, but at the same
time deprive them of tort and implied contract actions.
Unionized workers are covered by META to the extent permitted by
federal preemption law.42 In the past, the U.S. Supreme Court has tended
to reject preemption claims against state laws dealing with employment
discrimination, minimum labor standards, and employee welfare
generally.43 It is thus unlikely that a statute affording good-cause
protections would be preempted merely because workers were unionized.
A greater problem could arise, however, once employees became subject
to a union contract. The Court's current test for preemption under
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act)"
is whether an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is
necessary for a determination of the employee's right.4"
To my mind that approach is overly simplistic. Why should a union
worker lose a state statutory claim whenever a court is required to
examine the labor contract to see whether the employee's right to sue

41. Id. § 2(d). See also supra text in part H.B. concerning the 1989 annual meeting of the
NCCUSL.
42. META §§ 2(d), (e) commentary at 73 (Supp. 1993).
43. E.g., Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988); Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); New York Tel. Co. v. New York Dep't of Labor, 440
U.S. 519 (1979); Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, 372 U.S. 714
(1963).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
45. See Lingle, 486 U.S. 399; Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985). Cf. Barnes v.
Stone Container Corp., 942 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1991).
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might have been waived by a provision calling for arbitration instead?46
If anything, the contrary seems more plausible. Would it not raise a
serious constitutional question if a state statute denied employees certain
job protections because they had exercised their federal right to organize
and engage in collective bargaining?
META leaves the coverage of public employees to the choice of the
individual states.47 Uniformity is less important here since multi-state
employers are not involved. Furthermore, many public employees have
civil service protections, and all enjoy at least some constitutional rights
in their jobs.
3.

Preemption of Common-Law Actions

The underlying concept of META is an equitable trade-off of
opposing interests. Nowhere is this more evident than in the treatment of
the imaginative new causes of action that have been devised to contest
employee discharges. In return for the nearly t.niversal good-cause
protection it provides, META would preempt or extinguish most
common-law claims based on statutorily prohibited terminations,
including implied contract actions and all tort actions, such as
defamation, prima facie tort, and the intentional infliction of emotional
distress.48 META would not, however, displace rights or claims under
express contracts, such as fixed-term agreements, or under statutes or
administrative regulations. Nor would it restrict existing legislation
dealing with "whistle-blowing," race or sex discrimination, or
occupational safety and health.
META would also not affect independent torts like assault, malicious
prosecution, and false imprisonment, if facts exist separate and apart
from the termination itself to ground such causes of action. But
nomenclature is not the key to the survival of a tort. The test is whether
the basis of the suit is something other than the termination itself, or
something other than the steps that are reasonably necessary to effectuate
the termination.49 Kicking an employee on his way out the door would

46. For an argument that the Supreme Court's test is too sweeping, see Michael C. Harper,
LimitingSection 301 Preemption: Three Cheersfor the Trilogy, Only One for Lingle and Lueck 66
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 685, 706-13 (1990). See generally Note, NLRA Preemption of State Law Actions
for Wrongfil Dischargein Violation ofPublic Policy, 19 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 441 (1986).
47. META §§ 1(2), (7).
48. Id. §§ 2(c), (e).
49. META § 2(c) commentary at 73 (Supp. 1993).
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still be actionable. As indicated earlier,5" employees who do not receive
the good-cause protections of the statute retain all their common-law
rights and remedies. 5
The official commentary on META seeks to clarify several related
questions concerning the status of common-law claims. For example, an
employer's report of the grounds for an employee's dismissal to another
prospective employer would continue to be governed by existing state
tort law, including the doctrine of qualified privilege. 2 Similarly, the
preemption provision only applies to employee suits against an employer
or its representatives. META does not restrict an employer's capacity to
sue an employee on grounds such as disloyalty, theft or destruction of
property, or breach of a covenant not to compete. 3
4.

Remedies Under the Model Act

Remedies under META are those of the original federal Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 54 which include reinstatement, with or without back pay,
and attorneys' fees for a prevailing party. 5 When reinstatement is
impracticable, a severance payment may be granted up to a maximum of
36 months' pay for the most flagrant violations. Compensatory and
punitive damages are expressly excluded. 6
Employers won most of the battles over damages within the drafting
committee, including the elimination of double back pay for willful or
bad-faith terminations. That can be justified, however, not only on the
precedents of the Civil Rights Act and most union-sector arbitrations, but
also on the theory that returning wrongfully discharged employees to
their old jobs should be the primary goal of the legislation. A large
monetary award to punish a grievous misdeed may give momentary
satisfaction, but in the long run, an employee is likely to benefit more
from a restored opportunity to exercise acquired skills.
When reinstatement is not feasible because of the intensity of personal
hostility or other reasons, the decisionmaker has the authority to provide
a suitable severance payment. META proposes an extremely flexible
50. See supranote 41 and accompanying text.

51. META § 2(d).
52. META § 2(c) commentary at 73 (Supp. 1993).
53. Id.
54. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
55. META § 7(b).
56. Id. § 7(d).
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standard, based on the principle of proportionality. 7 The maximum
figure of three years' severance pay would no" necessarily apply
whenever unemployment was expected to last three years or more. Also
to be taken into account are the circumstances of the hiring, the length
and nature of the service, and the gravity of the employer's wrong in
firing the employee. The doctrine of mitigation would apply as well.
The drafters settled on the three-year period after much debate.
Employer representatives complained that a 36-months award would be
excessive under any circumstances. Representatives of the American
Association of Retired Persons complained it could be inadequate,
especially for an older worker who might never be able to find a job
equivalent to the one that was lost. The 36-months cap was one of those
practical compromises that cannot be wholly rationalized by a
quantitative analysis.
A prevailing party may receive attorneys' fees under the standards
governing civil rights legislation. 8 The purport is that a prevailing
employee should recover in ordinary course, "in all but special
circumstances," and a prevailing employer may recover in the discretion
of the court if the employee's complaint is "frivolous, unreasonable, or
without foundation."5 9 The availability of attor.eys' fees for fired
workers is a necessity, particularly in light of the elimination of
compensatory and punitive damages. Otherwise, flw if any rank-andfile employees will have monetary claims substantial enough to merit the
attention of lawyers operating on the basis of contingent fees.
5.

Proceduresfor Enforcement

Debates over enforcement procedures were about as heated as those
over the substantive provisions of META. Even persons ostensibly
espousing employees' interests, such as plaintiffs' lawyers and union
representatives, were often at odds. For instance, most plaintiffs'
lawyers wished to retain the right to jury trial. Union representatives
considered court proceedings too costly and cumbersome. Union and
management advocates joined in supporting arbitration as the principal
enforcement mechanism, but they divided over the latter group's

57. META § 7(b)(3) commentary at 80 (Supp. 1993).
58. META §§ 7(b)(4), (c)(2), (e), (f) and accompanying commentary.
59. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 417, 421 (1978); see also Albemarle
Paper Co. v. EEOC, 422 U.S. 405,415 (1975).
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proposal to authorize private arbitration arrangements as an alternative to
the state-administered system.
Eventually the drafters settled on three options for enforcing META.
The preferred method is the appointment of professional arbitrators by an
appropriate state agency."0 Arbitrators presumably have the expertise
and grasp of workplace realities to command the respect of both
employers and employees. Their greater experience should also make
for shorter and less expensive proceedings. In addition, the use of ad hoc
arbitrators would avoid the need to create a new permanent staff of
hearing officers.
Amendments to META, adopted from the floor at the 1991 annual
meeting, permit employers and employees to provide, by an express
writing, for the substitution of private dispute-resolution procedures or
court recourse as an alternative to the state-managed arbitration system."
The judicial alternative should cause relatively little trouble, since there
an agreement is authorized only after the dispute has arisen, usually after
the discharge has occurred and the employee has almost nothing to lose
by refusing to go along. But an agreement for private arbitration or a
similar device may be entered into at any time, and that is more
disturbing. Much as we prize freedom of contract in the abstract,
industrial realities counsel against too ready an acceptance of employee
waivers of statutory rights. Most individual workers have such
negligible bargaining power that they will sign any form an employer
places before them. That gives great power to management to stack the
deck in its favor. Therefore, in assessing any alternative scheme for
disposing of claims, the courts should not only look closely for any
coercion on the employer's part but should also insist on strict adherence
to due process standards before upholding the displacement of the
prescribed statutory procedures.
The burden of proof under META rests on a complainant employee.62
The allocation is a departure from arbitral practice in the unionized
sector but is in accord with the usual rule in the civil courts. In
recognition that the employer knows best why it terminated the
employee, however, META ordinarily requires the employer to proceed
first to present its case. The practical importance of the burden of
persuasion in arbitration, as distinguished from the burden of production,
is debatable. Many arbitrators insist they pay little or no heed to it in
60. META § 6.
61. Id. §§ 4(i),(j).
62. Id. § 6(e).
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their decision-making. I think that somewhat overstates the case, but my
own experience as an arbitrator leads me to agree that a substantial
majority of arbitral decisions are reached without regard to burdens of
proof.
Earlier versions of META provided for fairly detailed arbitration
procedures. The drafting committee ultimately decided, however, to rely
for the most part on a general reference to the Uniform Arbitration Act or
the applicable state arbitration statute, along with a directive to the
appropriate state agency to adopt any necessary supplemental rules and
regulations.63 This decision was in keeping with an overall policy of the
NCCUSL to avoid procedural prescriptions in substantive legislation
whenever possible. It also had the pragmatic advantage of eliding a
whole set of sticky technical issues. The significant question of
discovery, for example, is left to the discretion of the arbitrator, subject
to administrative rules to be issued by each state.64
META limits judicial review of arbitration awareds to such grounds as
fraud and corruption, an exceeding of authority, or a prejudicial error of
law. 65 This is still a broader scope of review than the U.S. Supreme
Court calls for in arbitrations under collective bargaining agreements,66
and the META standard evoked some criticism from the American
Arbitration Association (AAA). Granted, the U.S. Supreme Court does
not mention legal error as a basis for review. But the Court, in applying
its narrower test, was dealing with voluntary arbitrations pursuant to the
agreement of unions and employers that the awards would be "final and
binding." Even there, the Court has declined to give the same weight to
arbitral awards when individual statutory rights are, at stake. 67 META
implicates individual statutory rights, and imposes arbitration upon the
parties unless they agree otherwise. Consequently, the drafters added an
arbitrator's "prejudicial error of law" as a basis for judicial review.
Nonetheless, I believe there is sufficient merit in the AAA's reservations
about the potential loss of finality that a court should not vacate an award
absent a showing that an error of law has adversely affected the rights of
a party.

63. Id. § 6(a).
64. Id. § 6(c).

65. Id. § 8(c).
66. See United Paperworkers Intl. Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987); United
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
67. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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Some states may believe that it would be less costly to employ fulltime civil service or other government personnel as hearing officers than
to retain arbitrators on a case-by-case basis. META provides for such
staffing as an alternative to arbitration.68 A few states may fear that their
constitutional guarantees of jury trial or of access to the courts for the
full redress of wrongs preclude the substitution of other forums. I am
satisfied by my own research that only one or two states might be so
restricted. At any rate, for the benefit of such states, a third option under
META would allow enforcement by the civil courts.69 This would
undoubtedly be the most complex, expensive, and time-consuming
procedure.
6.

Buyouts and Waivers

An emphasis on voluntarism and freedom of contract inspired the
drafting committee to include an authorization for employer-employee
agreements modifying several aspects of the META scheme. The
alternative enforcement procedure of private arbitration has already been
discussed.7" In addition, by an express writing, the parties may dispense
with the good-cause protections and substitute a mandatory severance
payment of at least one month's pay for each year of service up to 30
months' pay.7 This "buyout" or waiver plainly suffers from the same
infirmities, from an employee's perspective, as afflict the previously
considered agreement for a private dispute resolution procedure.
Fortunately, well-accepted theories like economic duress and contracts
of adhesion may enable the courts to remedy the grosser instances of
overreaching. Moreover, apart from its generous payment schedule, the
severance provision has certain technical features that will tend to
confine its use to higher-level managerial or professional employees.
For example, the definition of termination in META includes a layoff of
more than two months.72 Under a valid buyout agreement, severance pay
becomes due if there is a termination for any reason except an
employee's willful misconduct, including what would otherwise be good
cause, like an economic downturn. An employer would therefore incur

68. META App., Alternative A.
69. META App., Alternative B.
70. See supra text accompanying note 61.
71. META § 4(c).
72. Id. § 1(8)(ii). An employee not subject to a buyout agreement would not have a claim,
however, since a layoff or termination resulting from economic conditions would be for good cause.
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the risk that any employee subject to periodic layoffs of more than two
months could treat the layoff as a termination and claim the severance
payment.
7.

Financing

The proposed new right to protection against wrongful discharge, like
any other public right, should be enforced by a publicly funded tribunal.
That is lofty principle speaking. The grim situation of most state
treasuries today sounds a different note. An extra fiscal burden of
unknown size could be the proverbial last straw for a proposal that will
probably generate stiff opposition in any event.
Accordingly, the META drafters suggest that the states consider
placing a substantial part of the cost on the parties themselves.7 3 I
calculate that a local arbitrator's fee and expenses fbr a case involving a
one-day hearing and an abbreviated opinion would be in the $1200 to
$1800 range. Administrative costs would add another $200 to $400. If
the total was shared equally, each party would pay about $700 to $1100.
The figure is not insignificant, but a person with a job at stake should be
able to come up with it. The employee's portion could be capped in the
amount of one or two weeks' pretermination pay. An alternative funding
method would be for a state to impose a special "employment
termination tax" on businesses subject to the statute, with an experience
rating like that used in unemployment insurance.
C.

Prospectsfor Enactment

So far Cornelius Peck has proven all too prescient in his forecast that
the lack of support from organized interest groups would stymie efforts
to enact legislation forbidding discharge without good cause.74 To date,
META, or bills based at least in part upon it, have been introduced in
about ten states.75 Quick or easy passage seems unlikely anywhere. The
AFL-CIO's Executive Council officially endorsed the concept of
statutory prohibition of unjust dismissal in 1987,76 and representatives of
73. META § 5(e) commentary at 77 (Supp. 1993).
74. See supratext accompanying notes 7-9.
75. Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, and
Oklahoma, with further variants in New York and Pennsylvania. This information was provided by
ULC headquarters in Chicago and by Professor Stuart Henry of Eastern Michigan University,
Ypsilanti, Michigan.
76. 9A Lab. Rel. Rep., I Ind. Empl. Rts. (BNA), No. 14, at 1 (Mar. 3, 1987).
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the AFL-CIO and the American Civil Liberties Union were the only
spokespersons for major groups to urge the NCCUSL to adopt a model
act in 1991." But counsel for the AFL-CIO have expressed concern
about META's acceptance of employer-sponsored alternative disputeresolution procedures and about the possibility of federal preemption of
state legislation. Union lobbyists have exhibited no enthusiasm for the
bills that have been introduced around the country.
Legal counsel for management have occasionally commended the
proposal as a fair compromise in private communications, but have not
rushed to go on record in support. Employers apparently remain
confident that the havoc of multimillion-dollar jury verdicts will befall
hapless colleagues elsewhere but not themselves. Or they believe that
such precautions as the excising of "just cause" policy statements from
employee handbooks will immunize them against liability.
Curiously, plaintiffs' attorneys are the most outspoken opponents of
META. No doubt some sincerely feel that such features as the denial of
punitive and general compensatory damages constitute fatal defects.7 8
Trying not to be too cynical, one must sadly conclude that others are
influenced by the prospective loss of the large contingent fees they now
receive from their upper-middle-class clients.
Hope for META or its equivalent ultimately rests on such intangibles
as Americans' regard for justice and fair play, and perhaps the
serendipitous emergence somewhere of a doughty crusader with either a
grievance or a sense of mission. Who would have predicted that
Montana would be the first state to pass "good cause" legislation? 79 Yet
I am told by observers on the scene that the campaign there was led by a
retired business executive whose company had been burned by what he
considered excessive court awards. I would be much less sanguine were
it not for the experience with the Uniform Law Commissioners. Their
initial reaction to the proposal of an act was skepticism, if not outright
antagonism. Over the course of three years, however, this tough-minded
group of veteran lawmakers came to see the inherent fairness of the
balance struck by META. Their overwhelming 39 to 11 final note of
approval is a warrant for optimism.

77. Copies of the letters are on file with the Washington Law Review.
78. See, e.g., Paul H. Tobias, Defects in the Model Employment Termination Act, 43 Lab. L.. 500
(1992).
79. MonL Code Ann. § 39-2-901 (1987).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The weaknesses of META are also its strengths. It is truly a
compromise, a product of many contentious voices, of many diverse
hands. But the presence of much partisan input should not obscure
another key element. Both within the drafting conmaittee and before the
full conference, persons with no vested interests determined the ultimate
shape of the Act. There was much discussion but eventually little
controversy about META's central tenet, that an emloyer should not be
able to fire a non-probationary employee without good cause. Every
other major industrial democracy in the world has accepted that principle
as a matter of simple justice.80 The principal votes on the floor of the
NCCUSL (apart from the early motion to discharge the drafting
committee) dealt with differences over the procedures to implement the
good-cause requirement. Now the issue rests with the legislatures of this
country. I know that even Professor Peck would applaud if he were
eventually proven wrong about their intransigence."'

80. Ass'n of Bar of City of New York, At-Will Employment and the Problemof Unjust Dismissal,
36 The Record 170, 175 (1981). In all, about 60 nations prohibit discharge without cause, including
the European Community, Sweden, Norway, Japan, Canada, and othe-s in South America, Africa,
and Asia. See also Convention No. 158 Concerning Termination of Ernployment at the Initiative of
the Employer,.Intemational Labour Conference and Recommendations, 68th Sess. xxxviii (June 22,
1982).
81. Professor Peck is one of 32 nationally prominent labor law and industrial relations scholars
who have signed a statement supporting META.

